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I. INTRODUCTION
The titleholder to a riverbed can reap significant economic benefits.
For example, ownership includes control over access to the lake or river,' as
well as a right to revenues generated by allowing commercial, industrial or
recreational access.2 Ownership of a riverbed also has important conse-
quences for regulatory jurisdiction and for determining whether federal,
state or tribal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over a cause of
action.3
* Third-year student, Northwestern School of Law, Lewis & Clark College, Portland Oregon;
A.B., 1980 Occidental College; A.M., 1981 University of Chicago.
The author wishes to thank Professor Michael C. Blumm of the Northwestern School of Law,
Lewis & Clark College, for his many helpful comments and suggestions on drafts of this paper.
1. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) [hereinafter referred to as
Montana].
2. For example, in Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 490 F.2d 521 (10th Cir. 1974), the Choctaw
and Chickasaw tribes sought damages totalling 786,641.67 dollars, derived from sand, gravel, and oil
and gas leases granted by the state on bedlands owned by the tribes.
3. See Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913); Morgan v. Colorado River Indian Tribe,
103 Ariz. 425,443 P.2d 421 (1968). See also Note, Riverbed Ownership Law Metamorphosed Into a
Determinant of Tribal Regulatory Authority--Montana v. United States, 1982 Wisc. L. REv. 264,
265 (1982).
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The high stakes involved have engendered considerable litigation over
riverbed rights, pitting states against Indian tribes as adverse claimants.
The disputed claims reflect a persistent conflict between two federal
policies. On one side, the canons of treaty construction represent a long-
standing policy in favor of upholding federal obligations to Indians,"
dictating that ambiguities in treaties and statutes should be resolved in
favor of Indian tribes. 5 On the other side, the federal "equal footing
doctrine"6 supports state claims in bedlands conflicts by creating a strong
presumption in favor of state sovereignty over navigable waterways within
state boundaries. 7
Prior to 1981, the courts were remarkably consistent in their disposi-
tion of riverbed claims cases, despite the conflict between the two federal
policies. The vast majority of decisions favored tribal claims in water rights
and streambed issues,8 while only a single case held for state sovereignty on
4. See. e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1886). Of course, the federal
government is not obligated to uphold treaties made with Indian tribes. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,
187 U.S. 553, 564-65 (1903) (which held that the federal government had power to abrogate treaty
with Kiowa, Comanche and Apache Tribes under its plenary authority over the tribes). However, when
the government does abrogate a treaty, just compensation may be due. See United States v. Creek
Nation, 295 U.S. 103 (1935).
5. See Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918). It has also been held
that treaties with Indian tribes are to be interpreted as the Indians would have understood them at the
time they were signed. See Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899); see also Choctaw Nation v.
Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 630 (1970).
6. The equal footing doctrine ensures newly admitted states sovereignty equal to that of the
original thirteen states.
7. The Supreme Court, in Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845), ruled that
beds of navigable waters are held by the United States in trust for future states. Sovereignty over the
bedlands passes to each state upon its admission to the Union. Equal footing was the rationale for the
decision. The original thirteen states had gained sovereignty over lands and bedlands within their
respective boundaries when the English Crown relinquished its title to those lands. For newly admitted
states to have equal sovereignty, it was thought necessary that they also acquire title to the bedlands
within their borders. Id. at 230.
That ruling was given the form of a strong, but rebuttable presumption in Shively v. Bowlby, 152
U.S. I (1894). Absent contrary congressional intent, federal grants of land to individuals were held to
extend no further than the high-water mark of navigable streams. Below that point, the bedlands are
held in trust for future states. Id. at 13,48, 51. In order to rebut that presumption, claimants must show
congressional intent to cede the bedlands in advance of a state's admission to the Union, which may only
be done to improve commerce with foreign nations or among the several states, or for other justifiable
public purposes. Id. at 48.
The Shively presumption was first used to invalidate a tribal bedlands claim in United States v.
Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926). The application of Shively to tribal claims cases, however, has
been criticized on grounds that the decision in Shively only considered conflicting claims between
states and individuals. The critics argue that Indian tribes are not individuals, and that the Shively
Court did not contemplate the application of its rule to tribes. See. e.g., Barsh and Henderson, Contrary
Jurisprudence: Tribal Interests in Navigable Waterways Before and After Montana v. U.S., 56 WASH.
L. REV. 627, 676-77 (1981).
8. See Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. at 632; Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United
States, 260 U.S. 77, 83 (1922); Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. at 89; Winters v.
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the basis of the equal footing doctrine.9 In 1981, however, the Supreme
Court, in Montana v. United States,10 ruled that the presumption of state
sovereignty over lands lying beneath navigable waters takes precedence
over the canons of treaty construction." The Court avoided overruling
prior decisions by enunciating sufficient exceptions in its ruling to support
all prior contrary rulings.' 2
The Supreme Court's decision in Montana has been roundly criti-
cized.' 3 However, it is not the purpose of this article to repeat those
criticisms. Rather, its purpose is to examine the difference Montana has
made in subsequent riverbed claim cases. Seven such cases have arisen
since Montana, all but one of them in the Ninth Circuit. 4 Surprisingly, five
of the seven decisions have been in favor of the tribal claimants.' 5
This paper examines the Montana ruling, which will be compared
with earlier precedent. It will become apparent that neither the Montana
rule, nor its exceptions, were precisely defined by the Court, leaving
questions as to the ruling's practical effect. Each of the Montana progeny
will then be examined to determine how the courts have applied the
Montana rule and exceptions. Finally, the Montana rule will be reviewed,
as it has evolved through the various subsequent court interpretations.
While aspects of the rule remain vague, exceptions to the rule have been
significantly extended, leading to the conclusion that Montana has not had
the extensive detrimental effect on Indian claims critics have feared.'0
Indeed, its rule has affected the disposition of only two cases.'" If Montana
had never been decided, the outcome of the five other subsequent cases
United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381-82 (1905).
9. See United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926).
10. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
I1. Id. at 551.
12. This argument has been made in Note, supra note 3, at 292.
13. See id. See also Arnott, In the Aftermath of the Bighorn River Decision: Montana Has
Title, Indian Law Doctrines Are Clouded, and Trust Questions Remain, 2 PuB. LAND L. REV. 1
(1981); Lusvardi, Montana v. United States - Effects on Liberal Treaty Interpretation and Indian
Rights to Lands Underlying Navigable Waters, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW 689-703 (1982). For a
particularly critical analysis, see Barsh and Henderson, supra note 7.
14. Wisconsin v. Baker, 524 F. Supp. 726 (W.D. Wisc.), modified, 698 F.2d 1323 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3537 (1983); Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 977 (1982) (Justices Rehnquist and White dissenting); United States
v. Washington, 694 F.2d 188 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3536 (1983); United States v. Aranson,
696 F.2d 654 (9th Cir), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 423 (1983); Puyallup Indian Tribe v. Port of Tacoma,
717 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1324 (1984); Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Trans-
Canada Enterprises, Ltd., 713 F.2d 455 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1324 (1984); In Re the
Washington Water Power Co., 25 FERC P61, 228 (1983).
15. The two exceptions are Wisconsin v. Baker, 524 F. Supp. 726 (W.D. Wisc. 1981), and
United States v. Aranson, 696 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1982).
16. See supra notes 12-13.
17. See supra note 15.
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would have been precisely the same, based upon earlier precedent.
However, the Montana ruling has affected the reasoning applied, requiring
the courts to make decisions within its framework.
In the final analysis, Indian tribes are not much worse off under the
Montana rule, as it has evolved through subsequent litigation. There is
reason for concern over the ambiguities in the rule, which allow opposite
conclusions to be drawn from similar language in different treaties. But
tribes may well consider the current state of affairs preferable to additional
Supreme Court decisions, which might shore up the rule, making it even
more difficult for tribes to succeed with bedlands claims.
II. MONTANA V. UNITED STATES 8
A. The Case
The Crow Indian Tribe of Montana sought to prohibit hunting and
fishing within its reservation by any non-member of the Tribe. 9 The Tribe
claimed it had the right to regulate fishing within its reservation based in
part on its ownership of the bed of the Big Horn River. 0 The State of
Montana disputed the Tribe's claim, arguing that title to the bed of the Big
Horn River vested in the State upon its entry into the Union, under
Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan,21 Shively v. Bowlby, 2 and the equal footing
doctrine.23 The United States brought suit proceeding in its own right and
on behalf of the Crow Tribe, as its fiduciary, to quiet title to the Big Horn
River.2 4
The Tribe based its claim of ownership upon the two Treaties of Fort
Laramie, the first signed in 1851 and the second in 1868.25 Under the first
treaty, the Federal Government recognized approximately 38.5 million
acres of land as Crow Territory, and Article 5 of the treaty specifically
reserved for the Indians their hunting and fishing rights on the land.28
Under the second Treaty of Fort Laramie, an 8 million acre reservation
was created for the Crows, through which the Big Horn River flows. That
treaty implicitly secured hunting and fishing rights for the Tribe by
prohibiting non-Indians from residing on or passing through the
reservation.27
18. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
19. Id. at 547.
20. Id. at 544, 550.
21. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
22. 152 U.S. I (1894).
23. See supra notes 6-7.
24. 450 U.S. at 549.
25. Id. at 547-48.
26. Id. at 548.
27. Id
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The issue, as framed by the Court, was whether the Federal Govern-
ment had conveyed ownership of the riverbed to the Crow Tribe by the
treaties of 1851 or 1868.28 If so, the United States continued to hold the
land in trust for the Tribe; if not, the bedlands passed to the State of
Montana upon its admission to the Union in 1889. 9
Justice Stewart, writing for a 6-3 majority, accepted the State's
argument that the ownership of bedlands of navigable rivers are an
incident of state sovereignty, and title to those lands passes to the state upon
its entry into the Union.30 While the Court recognized that the United
States has the power to convey lands below the high-water mark prior to a
state's admission, in order to perform some "appropriate public pur-
pose," 31 the Court adopted a strong presumption against such prior
conveyance, which could be defeated only by proof of an express or clearly
implied intention of Congress to convey.32 Justice Stewart admitted that
the establishment of an Indian reservation can be an appropriate public
purpose justifying Federal conveyance of a riverbed.3 3 Thus, the question
before the Court was whether the language of the two Treaties of Fort
Laramie or the circumstances surrounding enactment of the treaties
manifested a clear congressional intent to convey title of the Big Horn
River to the Crow Tribe.
The Court first concluded the language of the 1851 treaty was
insufficient to rebut the presumption against conveyance of the riverbed
because that treaty did not convey any land at all, but merely represented a
covenant with several tribes, recognizing the boundaries of their respective
territories. 4 By contrast, the 1868 treaty did constitute a conveyance of
land to the Crow Tribe, setting aside a specifically described reservation for
the undisturbed use and occupation of the Tribe. The Court, however,
determined that the language of that treaty was not strong enough to
overcome the presumption against conveyance of the bed of the Big Horn
River, 35 and concluded:
The mere fact that the bed of a navigable water lies within the
boundaries described in the treaty does not make the riverbed
part of the conveyed land, especially when there is no express
reference to the riverbed that might overcome the presumption
28. Id. at 550-51.
29. Id. at 551.
30. Id. See also Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
31. 450 U.S. at 551. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. at 48; see also supra note 7.
32. 450 U.S. at 552. See United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 55; see also supra note 7.
33. 450 U.S. at 555-56.
34. Id. at 553.
35. Id. at 554.
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against its conveyance. 31
Nor was the presumption against conveyance overcome simply because the
reservation was set aside for the sole use and occupation of the Tribe.3 7
The Court found no evidence of special circumstances surrounding
the enactment of the treaty which clearly indicated a congressional intent
to convey the bedlands to the Tribe. The situation of the Crow Indians, at
the time the treaties were entered into, presented no "public exigency"
which might have compelled Congress to deviate from its ordinary course
of holding bedlands in trust for future states.38 Consequently, the Supreme
Court ruled that neither the language nor the surrounding circumstances
of the treaties indicated any congressional intention to convey ownership of
the bed of the Big Horn River to the Crow Indian Tribe. Therefore, title to
the riverbed passed to the State of Montana upon its admission to the
Union, under the equal footing doctrine. 39
The question now becomes, just how explicit must a treaty be in order
to rebut the presumption against federal conveyance of a riverbed to an
Indian Tribe? 40 And, absent specific treaty language, what surrounding
circumstances are necessary to indicate congressional intent?
B. The Rule
Prior to Montana, the rule had been that a river flowing through a
reservation was owned by the tribe, unless specifically excluded from the
grant of lands by the treaty.41 The leading case in support of that rule is
Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma.42 That case concerned the Arkansas River,
which flowed through the Choctaw and Cherokee reservations, under the
1835 Treaty of New Echota.43 The Supreme Court ruled that the canons of
treaty construction controlled the disposition of the case, and not the equal
footing doctrine as the State of Oklahoma contended.44
In Montana v. U.S., the Supreme Court abruptly changed its view of
the law, making it very clear that the United States holds the beds of
navigable waters in trust for future states. Any prior conveyance of those
lands by the Government is not to be lightly inferred, and can only be
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 556.
39. Id. at 556-57.
40. It should be noted that the Shively presumption was not yet in effect at the time most of the
federal conveyances to Indian tribes took place. Therefore, when the treaties were drafted, it is not
likely the drafters would have been careful to indicate congressional intent to rebut the presumption,
even where there was such intent.
41. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. at 628.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 628.
44. Id. at 630.
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accomplished in furtherance of some appropriate public purpose.45 The
fact that the bed of a navigable water lies within the metes and bounds of an
Indian reservation is not a sufficient indication of congressional intent to
convey, absent corroborating evidence.46
The Montana court recognized two indicators of congressional intent
to convey, either of which alone would rebut the presumption of state
sovereignty.47 First, where the treaty expressly recognized tribal owner-
ship of the riverbed, congressional intent is obvious, and the conveyance
will stand.48 Even where the treaty language is not sufficiently express,
congressional intent to convey bedlands may be indicated by the circum-
stances surrounding the treaty. The Court asserted that where there exists
a "public exigency," requiring Congress to deviate from its policy under
the equal footing doctrine, intent to convey will be sufficiently clear.49 The
Court recognized two public exigencies which might operate in tribal
bedlands disputes. First, where an Indian tribe is dependent on the river for
its diet or way of life, the presumption of state ownership will be defeated.
The presumption will also be defeated when the circumstances surround-
ing the signing of the treaty indicate that the Government was attempting
to placate a dangerously unhappy tribe, in assuring that no reserved land
would ever be embraced within a state or territory. 50 The "public
exigency" in such cases will be referred to as the "national peace." The
"national peace" exigency allowed the Montana Court to avoid overruling
the Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma decision, while, at the same time, the
Court rejected the Choctaw decision's legal premise that the canons of
treaty construction control disposition of tribal bedlands claims.5 1
Justice Blackmun, in dissent, joined by Justices Brennan and Mar-
45. See supra note 7.
46. See supra note 36, and accompanying text.
47. Needless to say, neither of the two requisite indicators was present in Montana. See supra
note 7.
48. 450 U.S. at 552-54. It is not at all clear what constitutes an "express" conveyance under the
rule. We know from Montana that it is not enough for the treaty to convey to the tribe all rights to lands
within the metes and bounds of the reservation (seesupra note 37, and accompanying text), but what if
a treaty refers specifically to a river as a territorial boundary? Courts have commonly held that where a
treaty expressly refers to the mid-channel or mainstream of some river, then the bedlands of that river,
up to the midpoint, have been conveyed. See Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. at 631-32;
Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. at 8 1. But see, United States v. Aranson, 696
F.2d at 664 (contrary result in a post-Montana case, where treaty referred to the far bank of a river as a
reservation boundary), and infra notes 90-114 and accompanying text.
49. 450 U.S. at 556. See Shively, 152 U.S. at 48.
50. 450 U.S. at 555, n.5.
51. Id. See also supra notes 42-44, and accompanying text. The Choctaws were unhappy over
prior federal promises made to them and subsequently broken. They had to be forced to move to their
new reservation in Oklahoma, and it was on that reservation where the riverbeds at issue were located.
See 450 U.S. at 555 n.5.
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shall, argued that the Court ignored settled rules of treaty construction in
creating a presumption of state sovereignty over bedlands in tribal claim
cases.52 Regardless of what the government intended, ownership of a
riverbed should depend on the tribe's understanding of relevant treaty
language. 53 Blackmun also argued that under the majority's own rule, the
Tribe should have prevailed in Montana. In his view, Montana was
indistinguishable from Choctaw Nation; the same exigencies which led to
the Treaty of New Echota also inspired the Treaties of Fort Laramie. 54
Justice Stevens, concurring in the Court's opinion, disagreed with Black-
mun's assessment of the facts, finding it "significant" that Justice Stewart,
a member of the majority in Choctaw Nation, authorized the Montana
decision.55
Therefore, the Montana rule is that congressional intent to convey
bedlands to Indian tribes must be made clear either through express treaty
language or by the circumstances of the tribe, its needs and way of life, and
its relationship with the federal government. By establishing these reason-
ably broad indicators of intent, the Montana Court succeeded in preserv-
ing all the important prior rulings on tribal bedland claims.56
If Montana indeed preserved all those previous rulings, what is its
practical effect? Only two conclusions can be drawn from Montana with
certainty: first, the old metes and bounds rule has gone by the wayside; the
United States will not be held to have conveyed the bed of a navigable river
solely because it lies within the boundaries of a reservation. 7 Second,
Montana clearly establishes the primacy of the equal footing doctrine over
the traditionally determinative canons of treaty construction. No longer
will ambiguous treaty provisions be construed in favor of tribes when
riverbed ownership is at issue.
III. TRIBAL BEDLANDS CLAIMS AFTER Montana
Seven tribal bedlands claim cases have been decided since Mon-
52. Id. at 569.
53. Id. at 577.
54. Id. at 573-74, 576 n.l . See also supra notes 42-44, and accompanying text.
55. Id. at 569.
56. For example, the following decisions can be justified under the express treaty language
indicator-assuming treaties using mid-channels of rivers and bisected lakes as boundaries are
sufficient after Montana (see supra note 49); Brewer-Elliott Gas & Oil Co., 260 U.S. 77; Montana
Power Co. v. Rochester, 127 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1942); United States v. Pollmann, 364 F. Supp. 995 (D.
Mont. 1973).
The following cases can be included under the dependency-on-fish indicator: Alaska Pacific
Fisheries, 248 U.S. 78; Donnelly, 228 U.S. 243.
As stated in text accompanying notes 50-51, Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. 620, represents a second,
more ambiguous "public exigency," the "national peace."
57. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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tana,58 six of them within the geographic area of the Ninth Circuit. The
courts have held for tribal claimants in all but two of the cases, despite
having to work within the rule and exceptions provided by the Supreme
Court in Montana. Of the two cases that have held for the states, one likely
would have been decided precisely the same under earlier precedent,"'
while the other certainly owes its disposition to the Montana ruling.60
A. Wisconsin v. Baker61
Wisconsin v. Baker was the first case to be decided under the rule set
forth in Montana, and one of only two cases decided after Montana to hold
against tribal claimants. In Baker, the Lac Courte Oreilles Band of the
Chippewa Tribe of Lake Superior claimed a right to control hunting and
fishing on their reservation under treaties of 1837 and 1854. That claim
was based in part on ownership of navigable waters flowing through the
metes and bounds of the reservation. 62 The court found the language of the
treaties insufficient to overcome the presumption against conveyance of the
bedlands. 63 The court further found no "public exigency" on which to
support an implied governmental conveyance. In making that determina-
tion, the court relied on the primary congressional purposes behind the
treaties: to acquire title to Chippewa lands and to open the lands for non-
Indian settlement, while concentrating the Tribe in a small area.64 There
58. Two additional cases focus on an issue ancillary to that which is the subject of this paper,
whether aboriginal Indian title to riverbeds survives statehood. Aboriginal title gives a tribe the right to
continued exclusive occupation of its ancestral lands. See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.)
543, 574 (1823). In United States v. Pend Oreille County PUD No. 1, No. C-80-116-RMB (E.D.
Wash., May 29, 1984) (slip op.), the court held that the equal footing doctrine cannot operate where
tribal ownership is claimed under aboriginal title. In such cases, the federal government never has the
title to hold in trust for futurestates. Ofcourse, it is still incumbent on the tribes to prove the existence of
aboriginal title, which must not have been abandoned or abrogated by clear act of Congress. The equal
footing doctrine cannot itself abrogate such title. By proving aboriginal title, tribes are able to perform
an end-run around the Montana rule, which simply doesn't apply in such cases. See 27 Anad. Fish L.
Memo 15 (August, 1984).
For another case on the same issue, see Yankton Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Nelson, 521 F. Supp.
463 (D.S.D.), vacated and remanded, 683 F.2d 1160 (8th Cir.), 566 F. Supp. 1507 (D.S.D. 1983). In
that case, the district court granted the tribe's motion for summary judgment on its claim of riverbed
ownership. That ruling was vacated on appeal to the Eighth Circuit, where both parties agreed to a trial
on the merits. 683 F.2d at 1162. Before reaching the merits, however, the appellate court remanded for
a ruling on the navigability of the river at issue. The district court ruled that the river was indeed
navigable, and the case is now back before the Eighth Circuit for a ruling on the merits.
59. See Wisconsin v. Baker, infra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
60. See Aranson, infra notes 90-114 and accompanying text.
61. 524 F. Supp. 726 (W.D. Wis.), modified, 698 F.2d 1323 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
3537 (1983).
62. Id. at 733.
63. Id. It should be noted that the court did not set forth the relevant language of either treaty in
the opinion.
64. Id. at 731 (findings of fact numbers 74 and 75). It is interesting to note that the court did not
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was no indication of federal concern with the "national peace," as in
Choctaw Nation.65 Neither did the court find that the Tribe's reliance on
fishing constituted a "public exigency," concluding instead that by 1854
the Tribe had grown more dependent on agriculture than on hunting and
fishing. 66 Therefore, the court held the Tribe did not own the beds of
navigable waters within the boundaries of the reservation. Nevertheless,
the court concluded that the federal government had intended to give the
Tribe regulatory authority over hunting and fishing within the reserva-
tion. 67 So even though Montana was dispositive of the ownership issue, it
did not control the final outcome of the case.
It was unnecessary for the court to rely on Montana in order to rule
against tribal ownership of bedlands within the Chippewa reservation.
Based on certain findings of fact, the Government clearly intended by the
treaties to convey only dry lands to the Tribe.68 Moreover, tribal spokes-
men at the 1837 treaty negotiations were aware that such was the
government's intent.69 Therefore, even if the court relied exclusively on the
rule of liberal treaty construction, without reference to Montana, the
outcome of the case would have been the same.
B. The Namen and U.S. v. Washington Cases
The second case to be decided in the wake of Montana, and the first to
be decided by the Ninth Circuit, was Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes v. Namen.7 0 In that case, the court upheld the rights of Indian tribes
on the Flathead Reservation to regulate the exercise of riparian rights of
non-members on the southern half of Flathead Lake. The Tribes derived
their regulatory power from their ownership of that lake under the 1855
Treaty of Hell Gate, ratified in 1859.71 The treaty established a northern
boundary of the reservation which bisected Flathead Lake, thereby
including the southern half of the lake within the reservation.7 2
This was not the first occasion in which the Ninth Circuit had to
determine ownership of the bed of Flathead Lake; forty years earlier, the
inquire into the Tribe's purposes in signing the treaties. Perhaps it considered such inquiries irrelevant,
in view of the subordinated status of the canons of treaty construction after Montana.
65. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
66. 524 F. Supp. at 730.
67. Id. at 734.
68. Id. at 732 (finding of fact number 86).
69. Id.
70. 665 F.2d 951 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 977 (1982) (Justices Rehnquist and White
dissenting); see generally Note, Namen II: Do the Tribes Have the Authority to Regulate Non-Indian
Riparian Rights on Flathead Lake?, 4 PUB. LAND L. REV. 170 (1983).
71. 665 F.2d at 953.
72. Id. at 962.
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court held that the Tribes of the reservation owned it." The appellees,
including Namen, the City of Poison and the State of Montana, argued
that, after Montana v. United States, those earlier cases were no longer
good law.7 4 But the court was able to distinguish Montana on the facts,
determining that the language of the Hell Gate Treaty was intended to
convey the bed of the southern half of Flathead Lake to the Tribes.75
The court held that the bed of the south half of Flathead Lake is owned
by the United States in trust for the Tribes because that was the only
sensible interpretation the treaty allowed; why else would Congress create
a boundary half way across a lake? If the intention was to establish
reservation lands running only to the high-water mark, Congress would
most likely have made the southern edge of the lake the boundary of the
reservation.7 6
Reasonable as the Ninth Circuit's construction may have been, it is
unclear whether the Montana decision supports such an interpretation.
This is due to the Supreme Court's failure in Montana to clearly establish
what constitutes express conveyance for the purpose of overcoming the
presumption in favor of state ownership of bedlands.7 7 Indeed, Justice
Rehnquist, dissenting from the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in
Namen, suggested that conveyance to the mid-stream of a river would not
be a sufficient expression of congressional intent to convey bedlands to
overcome the presumption.7 8 Rehnquist would find a conveyance only
where a treaty specifically referred to rights granted in land under
navigable water.7 9
The Ninth Circuit, in Namen, did not rely solely on the express
language of the Hell Gate Treaty, but also rested its decision on two
"public exigenc[ies]." First, the court found that the Kootenai Indians, one
of the Tribes on the Flathead Reservation, depended heavily on fishing."
Furthermore, the "urgency" with which the Office of Indian Affairs
pressed Senate ratification of the treaty in the 1850's, in order to open up
large areas of the Washington Territory for non-Indian settlement, was
perceived by the court as constituting a separate "public exigency" under
the Montana rule.8' However, the court did not elaborate on either the
73. Montana Power Co., 127 F.2d at 191. That ruling was explicitly endorsed over an objection
made on the strength of Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, in Pollmann, 364 F. Supp. at 999. See 665 F.2d
at 960.
74. 665 F.2d at 961. See 450 U.S. 544.
75. 665 F.2d at 962.
76. Id.
77. See supra note 48, and accompanying text.
78. 459 U.S. 977 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), denying cert. to 665 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1982).
79. Id.
80. 665 F.2d at 962.
81. Id. The court, however, gave no precise definition or scope of application to its new exigency.
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"urgency" or the fishing exigency, but seemed to allude to them for the sole
purpose of satisfying the Montana criteria. Had the court truly relied on
those factors in making its determination, it is likely that evidence would
have been provided to support its findings.
In United States v. Washington,8 the Quinault Tribe of western
Washington presented the Ninth Circuit with precisely the same factual
situation as the Namen case.83 Like the Salish and Kootenai's, the
Quinault's reservation was established under the Hell Gate Treaty of 1859.
As a result, the court disposed of the Quinault's case merely by reference to
its prior decision.84 The court exhibited some concern with Justice
Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in the United States Supreme Court's
denial of certiorari n Namen,85 but concluded that it was for the Supreme
Court to more precisely define the Montana rule if it so desired. 86
Thus, after the first three decisions subsequent to Montana, the scope
of the rule remained uncertain. The Namen decision did, however, expand
the exceptions to the rule, establishing "urgency" as a valid "public
exigency," indicating congressional intent to convey bedlands of navigable
waters. The Ninth Circuit, however, failed to clarify its new exception to
the Montana rule; "urgency" seems indistinguishable from the general
concept of "public exigency. ' 87 The "urgency" the Ninth Circuit found to
indicate congressional intent to convey bedlands concerned the need to
quickly open former Indian lands to non-Indian settlement.8 " But it is
questionable whether the government has ever entered into a treaty with an
Indian tribe without some similar kind of "urgency." The purpose and
scope of the "urgency" exigency remain unclear because no court has
applied the exception since Namen.
The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Namen marks the only
occasion the Court has taken since Montana to comment on the evolution
of the rule adopted in that case.8 9 By denying certiorari, the Court tacitly
approved the Ninth Circuit's application of the Montana rule and its
Query: what is the difference between "urgency" and the general concept of "public exigency"?
82. 694 F.2d 188 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3536 (1983).
83. Id. at 189.
84. Id.
85. Id. See 459 U.S. 977; see also supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
86. Id.
87. Arguably, "urgency" refers to congressional concerns, while "public exigencies" generally
refer to tribal circumstances. There is also some doubt as to whether "urgency" is distinguishable from
the "national peace" exigency. Perhaps the latter applies to situations of open hostility, while
"urgency" appears in circumstances where possible future hostility is threatened. Even so, that would
not constitute much of a distinction. And regardless, the question remains, what treaties were ever
entered into without some sense of urgency.
88. 665 F.2d at 962.
89. 459 U.S. 977.
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exceptions. The approval was not unanimous, however, as Justice Rehn-
quist's dissent, joined by Justice White, indicates.
C. United States v. Aranson"
The Aranson case is the most troublesome of the tribal bedlands claim
cases since Montana. In Aranson, the Colorado River Indian Tribes sought
to have a number of individuals and corporations removed from what they
claimed was a part of their reservation, which centers on and around the
meandering Colorado River.9 1
The Tribes claimed ownership of a part of the bed of the river along
the border between California and Arizona under an 1865 treaty.92 The
treaty expressly conveyed lands to, and sometimes beyond, the eastern
bank of the river.93 After the treaty was signed, the river altered its course,
carving out various channels through the valley, and moving slowly
westward.94 The Tribes claimed that the changes in course were due to
accretion,9 5 and therefore, the boundaries of the reservation had expanded
to include lands currently occupied by the individuals and corporations
named as defendants.9 However, the court did not decide the boundaries
of the reservation, merely stating the applicable law to be applied by the
District Court in making that determination on remand.9 7
The court, in a section of the opinion authored by Judge Trask, ruled
on the Tribes' claim of ownership of the bed of the Colorado River, holding
that the bedlands had not been conveyed by the 1865 treaty.98 This
determination was made especially difficult due to the anomalous nature of
the transaction.
An executive order, subsequent to the treaty, dated 1876, expressly
provided that the western boundary of the reservation was to run along the
west bank of the Colorado River. 9 Under normal circumstances, the
90. 696 F.2d 654 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 423 (1983).
91. Id. at 656. The Tribes also sought damages for wrongful possession.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 656, 664.
94. Id. at 656.
95. "Accretion" occurs when land is gradually eroded from one bank of a river and deposited on
the other side. In such cases, the boundary between the two properties or states moves with the river.
Thus, an accretion of land from east to west would increase the size of the eastern property-in this
case, Arizona.
Where a sudden change occurs in a river's course, the change is labelled "avulsive." Such changes
in course do not affect the boundaries. See 696 F.2d at 659-63.
96. 696 F.2d at 656-57.
97. The court concluded that California state law should rule the decision, but denied invocation
of that state's artificial accretion exception, to the effect that the state's law would not decide the
boundaries differently than would federal law. 696 F.2d at 663.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 664.
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probable interpretation of such a grant would be that Congress intended
thereby to convey the riverbed.'00 However, there was a complicating
factor: In 1876, the United States could not have conveyed the western half
of the riverbed, because California had already become a state.'0 ' The
Aranson court stated that, prior to Montana, it would have read the 1876
order as conveying the eastern half of the riverbed to the Tribes, but
concluded that Montana precluded such an analysis. 02 The court held the
language of the order was not sufficiently express to indicate congressional
intent to convey any of the Colorado River bedlands. 10 3 Neither did the
court find any "public exigency" to justify tribal ownership: The Tribes
were not heavily dependent on the river as in Namen' 04 and the legislative
history behind the treaty was not compelling. 05 The court did not consider
either the Namen "urgency" exigency 10 6 or the "national peace"
exigency. 107
This is a puzzling decision from the Ninth Circuit, which has been
recognized for its "broad interpretation" of the Montana ruling.'0 8 Unless
the language in the treaty referring to the west bank of the river was simply
a drafting mistake, 09 it would be far more reasonable to interpret the
executive order of 1876 as conveying the eastern half of the riverbed to the
Tribes. It is unclear why the court was dissuaded from that conclusion by
the existence of the Montana rule, especially considering the Namen
ruling."'
Aranson stands alone among the seven cases arising since Montana; it
is the only one that owes its disposition exclusively to the Montana rule.
The Ninth Circuit made clear that if the Montana rule had not existed, the
court would have held the lands underneath the eastern half of the
Colorado River were owned by the Tribes."' What makes the case
100. Otherwise, why not simply convey to the east bank? The language in Aranson is analogous
to a grant to the mid-point of a river. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
101. 696 F.2d at 664. California was admitted to the Union in 1850. At that time, under the
equal footing doctrine, California received ownership of the bedlands of all navigable waters in the state
(see supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text). As the Colorado River formed the boundary between
California and Arizona, California received title to the western half of that river's bed.
102. 696 F.2d at 664.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 666. See supra notes 75-86 and accompanying text.
105. Id. at 665.
106. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
108. Lusvardi, supra note 13, at 703.
109. There was no evidence to that effect.
110. The Namen court held conveyance to a river's mid-channel is sufficient expression of
congressional intent to convey bedlands. See supra notes 75-76, and accompanying text.
I 11. 696 F.2d at 664. Even the Baker case, supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text, could
have been disposed of exactly the same without reliance on Montana.
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especially troublesome is that it appears to conflict strongly with the earlier
Namen decision. 112 In Namen, conveyance to the midpoint of a lake was
held to be sufficient expression of congressional intent to convey. By
contrast, in Aranson, the court found treaty language insufficient, where
conveyance was to the far bank of a river. While it is true that the Namen
court buttressed its decision by finding the existence of public exigen-
cies,1 3 the court asserted that the language of the Hell Gate Treaty alone
was sufficiently expressive of congressional intent to convey." 4 The Namen
and Aranson cases simply cannot be reconciled. Indeed, Namen was not
even mentioned in Aranson, which followed Namen by a full year. This
may indicate a failure of counsel for the Tribes in Aranson to adequately
research and present the relevant precedent, and a failure of the court to
supplement counsel's efforts with research of its own.
D. The Puyallup and Muckelshoot Cases
The Ninth Circuit quickly reasserted itself as a liberal interpreter of
the Montana rule, deciding two cases in a single day, both in favor of tribal
claimants. In Puyallup Indian Tribe v. Port of Tacoma,"5 the Tribe
sought to quiet title to the bed of the Puyallup River.116 The Tribe claimed
ownership of the river under the Treaty of Medicine Creek of 1854 and a
subsequent executive order in 1857."11
Under the Treaty of 1854, the Puyallup Tribe was settled on a site that
did not include access to the Puyallup River and its fishery, on which the
Tribe was heavily dependent. 118 The Tribe was very dissatisfied with its
reservation and "agitated vigorously" for an enlargement to include a
section of the river."l 9 When hostilities arose between the dissatisfied
Indians and the non-Indian settlers, 20 the United States Government
convened the Fox Island Council to restore peace.' 21 The resulting
agreement enlarged the reservation to include the lower portion of the
river. 2 2 The agreement was adopted by President Pierce in an Executive
Order of January 20, 1857.123 According to the Puyallup court, the federal
government's intention to convey title to the riverbed to the Puyallup Tribe
112. See supra notes 70-81, and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 80-81, and accompanying text.
114. 665 F.2d at 962.
115. 717 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1324 (1984).
116. Id. at 1253.
117. Id. at 1253, 1260.
118. Id. at 1253, 1259.
119. Id. at 1253.
120. Id. at 1260.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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was made clear by the negotiations at the Fox Island Council."2 4
The court found sufficient evidence of intent to convey on the basis of
two "public exigenc[ies]" surrounding the Treaty of Medicine Creek and
subsequent executive order. First, the court determined that the Tribe was
dependent on the fish runs of the Puyallup for their year-round subsistence
and commercial trade.'15 Moreover, the executive order, resulting from the
Fox Island Council agreement, evidently was issued to restore peace to the
region and to calm the hostilities caused by the insufficiency of the original
Treaty of Medicine Creek.'26
The Puyallup ruling controlled the subsequent decision in Muckel-
shoot Indian Tribe v. Trans-Canada.'27 The Muckelshoot Tribe sought to
quiet title and to eject trespassers from lands that had constituted the bed
of the White River, where it had formerly passed through the Muckelshoot
reservation.28
As in Puyallup, the reservation was first established under the treaty
of Medicine Hat in 1854, but that Treaty did not grant the Tribe access to
the river, on which they were heavily dependent.' 29 The Tribe made known
their dissatisfaction with the Treaty, and Indian agents and officers warned
the government of impending trouble.' In 1874, President Grant signed
an executive order enlarging the Muckelshoot reservation to include the
White River, as a direct response to the Tribe's dissatisfaction with the
Medicine Hat Treaty, and its desire to have a traditional fishery within the
reservation."'
Thus, the same public exigencies present in Puyallup were also
present in the Muckelshoot case: concern with the "national peace" and
recognition of the tribe's dependency on the fish runs of a neighboring river
for food, trade and religious practices.132 The court in Muckelshoot did not
need to go through the entire argument again; it simply relied on Puyallup.
Puyallup and Muckelshoot did not add anything substantive to the
Montana rule or its exceptions. However, the two decisions firmly
entrenched the concept of "public exigency," making it very clear that
124. Id. at 1260-61.
125. Id. at 1259.
126. Id. at 1260. Thus, this case falls within the "public exigency" represented by Choctaw
Nation, 397 U.S. 620. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the
status of Choctaw Nation, concluding that Montana had overruled neither the holding nor the analysis
of that case. 717 F.2d at 1257.
127. 713 F.2d 455 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1324 (1984). This decision was only
subsequent to Puyallup by a matter of hours, and was, in fact, reported prior to Puyallup.
128. 713 F.2d at 456.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 458.
131. Id. at 456.
132. Id. at 458.
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reliance on fish runs for food, commerce and religious practices would
indicate congressional intent to convey. The Puyallup and Muckelshoot
cases were also the first two decisions after Montana to make use of the
"national peace" exigency, which the Montana Court had only-vaguely
fashioned to distinguish Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma.133 Perhaps most
importantly, the Puyallup and Muckelshoot cases signified the Ninth
Circuit's return to a reasonably liberal interpretation of the Montana rule,
after the court's position had been placed in doubt by its ruling in
Aranson13 4
E. The Spokane River Project Case
The most recent case to be decided under the Montana rule was In re
The Washington Water Power Co.,135 a Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) decision, requiring a licensee under the Federal
Power Act of 1920 (FPA) 36 to pay the Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Indians an
annual fee for the use of tribal lands by the Spokane River hydro-electric
project. The licensee proposed to use Coeur d'Alene Lake as a reservoir.
However, a part of that lake was within the Indian reservation, established
in 1867, by executive order of President Johnson.3 The Tribe claimed
beneficial ownership of the bedlands at the southern end of the lake, and
therefore claimed a right, under § 10 of the FPA, to compensation for its
use as a reservoir.13 8 The licensee argued that the Tribe did not have title to
the bedlands beneath Coeur d'Alene Lake because ownership of the lake
passed to the State of Idaho upon its admission to statehood in 1890, under
the equal footing doctrine and Montana v. United States.139
FERC found the history of the Coeur d'Alene Indian reservation
indicated that Congress intended to convey the lakebed to the Tribe.140 In
133. 397 U.S. 620 (1970). See supra notes 50-51, and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 90-114 and accompanying text.
135. 25 FERC P61,228 (1983).
136. 16 U.S.C. §§ 790-828 (1982). As a FERC decision, this case may be of more limited
precedential value than the other cases analyzed in this paper. Because of thejudicial review provisions
of the FPA, however, its value should not be underestimated. 16 U.S.C. § 825 l(b) (1984), allows
aggrieved parties to petition an appropriate U.S. Court of Appeals for review of a FERC decision. In
this case, the appropriate courts would be the Ninth and D.C. Circuits.
137. 25 FERC at 61,577. See also 16 FERC P62,096,63,192 (1981) (concerning use of Coeur
d'Alene Lake as a reservoir).
138. 25 FERC at 61,576. § 10 of the FPA provides: "(e) That the licensee shall pay to the United
States reasonable annual charges in an amount to be fixed by the Commission. . .for recompensing it
for the use, occupancy, and enjoyment of its lands or other property. . .Provided, that when licenses
are issued involving the use of. . .tribal lands embraced within Indian reservations the Commission
shall. . . , subject to the approval of the Indian tribe having jurisdiction of such lands ... fix a
reasonable annual charge for the use thereof. 16 U.S.C. § 803(3).
139. 25 FERC at 61,567.
140. There were a number of successive executive orders and agreements between the Tribe and
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1887, the Tribe entered into an agreement with the Northwest Indian
Commission, under which the Tribe ceded a large portion of aboriginal
territory to the federal government in exchange for a permanent home.'41
The federal government agreed that "no part of said reservation shall
[ever] be sold, occupied, open to white settlement or otherwise disposed of
without consent of the Indians residing on said reservation.' 42 When
Congress ratified that agreement in 1891, it also ratified a conveyance by
the Tribe of three river-channels running through the reservation, to a non-
Indian. 43 Congress at that time must have been under the impression that
in 1867 the president had conveyed the reservation's bedlands to the Tribe.
Moreover, an 1873 executive order by President Grant created a
northern boundary of the reservation that ran along the center channel of
the Spokane River. 144 FERC concluded that an express reference to the
center of a channel in a treaty or executive order was sufficient to show
congressional intent to convey bedlands. 145 A subsequent 1889 agreement
between the Tribe and the Indian Commission resulted in a new northern
boundary of the reservation, which bisected Lake Coeur d'Alene, making
the case analogous to the Ninth Circuit's Namen decision.146 The 1889
agreement, like that of 1887, was ratified by Congress in 1891 .141
Based on the numerous agreements between the Tribe and the
government, the government clearly intended at all times that the Indians
should own the beds of navigable waters within their reservation. If the
government had intended otherwise, congressional actions taken after
Idaho was admitted to the Union were inconsistent with state ownership of
the bedlands. FERC concluded that throughout the various agreements,
the government and the Indian Tribe "were negotiating the beneficial
ownership of the bedlands of the lake and river."' 48
Apparently, FERC was content to base its ruling of tribal ownership
entirely on the language of the various executive orders and ratified
agreements between the Tribe and the government. Nowhere in its opinion
the government, altering the reservation, but never to the exclusion of Coeur d'Alene Lake. See, 25
FERC at 61,577-578.
141. 25 FERC at 61,581-582.
142. Id. This agreement was ratified by Congress in 1891, eight months after Idaho was
admitted to the Union, on an equal footing with the other states. 25 FERC at 61,576. Thus arose an
interesting and unique issue for the Commission, which concluded that the controlling date was the
date of agreement, not the date of congressional ratification. 25 FERC at 61,587.
143. 25 FERC at 61,593 n.1 1, 61,587. See also the Indian Department Appropriations Act of
1891, 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1982).
144. 25 FERC at 61,580-581.
145. Id.
146. 25 FERC at 61,583. See also supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
147. 25 FERC at 61,593 n. I, 61,587. See 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1982). See also supra note 138.
148. 25 FERC at 61,584.
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did FERC refer to the issue of "public exigenc[ies]."
The importance of the FERC decision lies in its reading of the express
treaty language rule of Montana. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court had
not made clear whether an express reference to a river's mid-channel would
be sufficient to indicate congressional intent to convey under the Montana
rule.14 9 Although the FERC ruling supports such an interpretation, 5 ' the
decision did not rest solely on the language of the various documents, but
also on the history of the negotiations between Tribe and government. Of
conclusive importance was the congressional ratification of the Tribe's
1871 conveyance of river-channels to a non-Indian.' 5 '
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The trend of the Montana progeny is clearly towards an expansion of
the "public exigency" exceptions to the Montana rule. At least in the Ninth
Circuit, if a tribe has historically been dependent on a body of water for
subsistence fishing, trade or for religious practices, then the court will hold
that the tribes own bedlands within their reservation. 52 The Ninth Circuit
has also added a new exigency not mentioned in Montana: If the
circumstances behind the creation of a reservation indicate a sense of
"urgency" on the part of Congress, e.g., to secure Indian territory for non-
Indian settlement, then that "urgency" might indicate congressional
intent to convey bedlands to a tribe.' 53 Finally, the courts have made
consistent use of the "national peace" exigency, established by the
Supreme Court in Montana to avoid overruling Choctaw Nation v.
Oklahoma. 54
More difficult to assess is the status of the Supreme Court's alternative
149. See supra notes 49 and 77.
150. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
152. For an especially strong statement of this exigency, see Puyallup Indian Tribe v. Port of
Tacoma, 717 F.2d at 1258.
153. See Namen, 665 F.2d at 962.
The "urgency" exigency is of questionable value because it does not seem distinguishable from the
general concept of "public exigency" in any meaningful way. Also, "urgency" is one term applicable to
virtually every circumstance in which the United States entered into a treaty with an Indian tribe. The
"overriding goal" of the United States in treaty negotiations was to obtain Indian lands for non-Indian
settlement in areas where Indian lands had become surrounded by non-Indian settlements. F. COHEN,
HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 66 (1982 ed.). Securing Indian lands for non-Indian
settlement was the basis for the "urgency" exigency fashioned by the Namen court. 665 F.2d at 662.
See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
The "urgency" exigency has not been employed by a single court sinceNamen, indicating a lack of
judicial faith in its value as a distinct exigency under the Montana rule.
154. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. Subsequent cases making use of that
exigency include: Puyallup Indian Tribe, 717 F.2d at 1260; Muckelshoot Indian Tribe, 713 F.2d at
457-58.
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means of establishing congressional intent to convey bedlands to a tribe:
express treaty language. Is it sufficient for the treaty to mention the mid-
channel of a stream, or does the Montana rule require that the treaty
expressly refer to the beds beneath that channel? The Montana progeny
give conflicting answers.
In United States v. Aranson,155 the Ninth Circuit held treaty
language insufficient to convey even the eastern half of the Colorado River,
where the treaty set the western boundary of a reservation on the western
bank of a river.156 In contrast, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion, in In re Washington Water Power Co., 57 ruled that a reservation
boundary established at the mid-channel of a river indicated conveyance of
the bedlands of that river, within the boundary. 58 The FERC decision was
based on the earlier Ninth Circuit decision in Namen,15 9 which was not
even mentioned in Aranson."'6 The Montana decision gave no indication
whether the mention of a mid-channel would be sufficient expression of
congressional intent to overcome the presumption against conveyance.
Nevertheless, it is likely that the Supreme Court would find a conveyance
in such circumstances, in order to avoid overruling a number of pre-
Montana cases decided on that basis.161 Another reason the Court might be
more inclined to find a conveyance in such situations is the common sense
reason expressed by both the Ninth Circuit and FERC. 62 If Congress had
not intended to convey bedlands by bounding a reservation at the mid-point
of a river or lake, then why did it go through the troube of drawing the
boundary at that point? Certainly Congress was not precluded from
bounding the reservation at the near bank of the river or lake. If the Ninth
Circuit in Aranson had asked those questions, perhaps the case would have
come out differently. As it stands, the decision remains contrary to the
trend of Ninth Circuit cases.' 63
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Montana v. United States14 seemed
to establish the dominance of the equal footing doctrine over the canons of
155. 696 F.2d 654.
156. See supra notes 92-103 and accompanying text.
157. 25 FERC P61,228.
158. See supra notes 144-145 and accompanying text.
159. 25 FERC at 61,584.
160. See supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
162. See 665 F.2d at 962 n.28; 25 FERC at 61,584.
163. See supra notes 90-114 and accompanying text.
164. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
[Vol. 6
TRIBAL BEDLANDS CLAIMS
liberal treaty construction.' 6" In conveyances of lands to Indian tribes
under treaties, executive orders and congressionally ratified agreements,
the equal footing doctrine creates a presumption against conveyance of
lands lying beneath the high-water mark of navigable waters.' 66 The
presumption favors federal retention of bedlands in trust for future
states.167 According to the Court, there are only two ways the presumption
can be rebutted: by sufficiently express treaty language indicating congres-
sional intent to convey, or by a showing that a "public exigency" existed at
the time the treaty was entered into, making it clear that Congress intended
to act contrary to the equal footing doctrine.6 8
Critics feared the impact of Montana on future cases, 69 but their
fears have not been realized. Of seven cases decided since Montana, only
Baker170 and Aranson'7' owe their disposition to the Montana rule, and
Baker might well have been decided the same under earlier precedent. 172
Of course, all seven of the decisions had to base their reasoning along the
lines of the Montana rule and its exceptions.
The Montana progeny have significantly extended the "public exi-
gency" exception to the rule, adding a new, if indistinguishable "urgency"
exigency, while enlarging the scope of those originally established in the
Montana decision.'7 3 However, what constitutes sufficiently express con-
gressional intent has remained vague, resulting in conflicting decisions in
cases based on similar treaty language. ' 71 Such conflicts are likely to
continue until the Supreme Court decides another tribal bedlands case, at
which time the Court should more precisely define the parameters of the
Montana rule and its exceptions.
Tribes might prefer to take their chances under the ambiguities of the
rule as it now stands, however, rather than give the Supreme Court an
opportunity to fortify the rule and narrow its exceptions. Justice Rehnquist
has indicated that if tribes take the question back to the Supreme Court,
they may lose more than they gain. 17 5 The Montana decision itself
demonstrates that the traditional trust relationship between the federal
government and Indian tribes, with its attendant canons of treaty and
statutory construction, has lost the support of a Supreme Court with a
165. See supra note II and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
167. Id.
168. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 90-114 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 81 and 153 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 155-163 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
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predilection for states' rights.'76 Fortunately, it is unlikely the Court will be
hearing a tribal bedlands claims case any time in the near future. With the
exception of Justices Rehnquist and White, the Court seems content to
allow the Montana rule to evolve in the lower courts for the time being.
Certiorari has been denied to each of the six cases discussed in this paper
which have been decided at the appellate level.177
176. On the federal government's trust relationship with the Indians, see F. COHEN, supra note
153, at 220-228.
177. See supra note 14. The seventh decision, the Spokane River Project Case, will have to be
appealed to either the Ninth Circuit or the D.C. Circuit before the Supreme Court may be petitioned
for certiorari. See supra note 136.
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